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Abstract
Economies of agglomeration are central to the understanding of the emergence of
industrial clustering. However, existing models that incorporate such agglomera-
tion economies have been largely neglecting the vast amount of empirical evidence
on inter-sectoral diﬀerences in the patterns of industrial concentration. In this pa-
per, we propose a baseline model of ﬁrm location in presence of dynamic increasing
returns. The model is able to deliver testable implications about the long-run dis-
tribution of the size of spatial clusters which we test against data on geographical
location of Italian ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent sectors. We show that accordance of
theoretical predictions with data is quite high. Moreover, we ﬁnd statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences in the strength of economies of agglomeration, not only across
geographical locations but also across industrial sectors. We argue that geograph-
ical clustering is highly aﬀected by intersectoral diﬀerences in innovation patterns
and learning regimes that map into diﬀerent drivers of sector- and location-speciﬁc
dynamic increasing returns to agglomeration.
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11 Introduction
Over the last two decades, there has been a widespread resurgence of studies sharing the
notion that “space matters in economic activity”. In particular, much eﬀort has been
devoted to a theoretical exploration of the mechanisms underlying the process of industrial
clustering both within and across countries.
Patterns of spatial concentration of ﬁrms have often been interpreted in a comparative
advantage framework as the outcome of a static, well-deﬁned, trade-oﬀ between agglomera-
tion and dispersion forces1. In this view, spatial locations display ex-ante,w e l li d e n t i ﬁable,
diﬀerences in initial endowments, transport costs and market interactions which uniquely
determine the observed industrial concentration as a predictable equilibrium outcome.
However, the vast amount of empirical and appreciative studies about ﬁrm locational
patterns in the U.S., Asia and Europe, seems to suggest that industries are more highly
clustered than any standard theory of comparative advantage might predict (cf. Krugman
(1991) and Fujita, Krugman & Venables (1999)).
Many interpretations have consequently assumed that the primary engine of concentra-
tion lies instead in some form of economies of agglomeration (i.e. positive market external-
ities). Long-run concentration patterns would therefore arise because of a self-reinforcing
process in which the decision of a ﬁrm to locate in a given area induces a net increase in
proﬁts enjoyed by ﬁrms deciding to follow her thereafter. As a result, clustering processes
might display multiple equilibria and path-dependence. Historical accidents could then
have long-run cumulative consequences, possibly leading to agglomeration patterns that
would not have been selected on the basis of initial conditions only.
Within a such an expanding literature, distinct families of models subscribe to quite
diﬀerent assumptions, on both system-level drivers of agglomeration and microeconomic
behaviors. On the one hand, the ‘New Economic Geography’ (NEG) perspective (see Fu-
1This intuition, pioneered by Von Thünen (1826) and further developed by Christaller (1933) and
Lösch (1940), also informs studies in Isard (1956) and Henderson (1974) on urban systems. For more
recent studies, see Papageorgiou & Smith (1983), Fujita (1988) and Fujita (1989).
2jita, Krugman & Venables (1999)) primarily focuses on locational choices undertaken by
fully informed ‘rational’ ﬁrms who live within static environments and interact in monopo-
listically competitive markets. On the other hand, a second class of formalizations is based
on quite distinct assumptions, including sequential, irreversible, decisions made by adap-
tive ﬁrms who interact in explicitly dynamic environments (cf. Arthur (1994) and Rauch
(1993)).
Notwithstanding their respective merits and weaknesses (cf. Martin (1999) for a criti-
cal overview), it is rather remarkable that both approaches largely share the neglect for a
parallel, massive, literature from innovation studies concerning sector-speciﬁcp r o c e s s e so f
technological learning, bearing obvious eﬀects upon the locational stickiness of productive
knowledge; the diﬀerent nature and importance of technological externalities and spillovers;
the abilities of incumbents to internalize and ‘carry within themselves’ knowledge comple-
mentarities. In brief, one still witnesses a dramatic lack of dialogue between economic
geography and ‘spatial’ economics, on the one hand, and the economics of technological
change, on the other.
This work is meant as a preliminary contribution to ﬁll this large gap. We explore the
basic drivers of spatial agglomeration processes of economic activities and their speciﬁcities,
both across industries and across spatial locations. More speciﬁcally, we ask the following
questions: How can one explain the huge, empirically observed, diﬀerences in agglomeration
patterns across industrial sectors? Are there systematic agglomeration drivers that are
entirely sector-speciﬁc and operate besides local agglomeration forces (possibly generated
by some widespread form of dynamic increasing returns or spatial externalities) inducing
concentration independent of technological and learning characteristics of each ﬁrm?
In order to address these issues, we propose a simple stochastic model of industrial clus-
tering in which myopic ﬁrms make locational choices in presence of dynamic agglomeration
economies. The latter stem from both standard comparative advantage arguments (making
some locations inherently more attractive than others) and dynamic increasing returns in
locating close to other ﬁrms. In turn, dynamic increasing returns may be characterized
3by both location-speciﬁc and technology-speciﬁc drivers. Therefore, heterogeneous concen-
tration patterns among geographical sites and industrial sectors are likely to arise. The
model yields empirically testable predictions on the equilibrium distribution of the size
of spatial clusters and on the diverse relevance of agglomeration forces across industrial
sectors. We compare the predictions of the model with some evidence on the geographical
distribution of Italian ﬁrms across a set of industries which might be considered archetypes
of distinct regimes of technological learning (see Pavitt (1984), Dosi (1988), Malerba &
Orsenigo (1996) and Marsili (2001)). The evidence strongly supports the view that in-
tersectoral diﬀerences in economies of agglomeration might be (at least partly) explained
by diﬀerences in innovation patterns and learning regimes displayed by ﬁrms belonging to
diverse industrial sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂyd i s c u s st h e
state-of-the-art on both theoretical and empirical studies of spatial clustering of economic
activities. Section 3 describes the model. In Section 4 we present testing procedures and
econometric results with reference to some benchmark industries (i.e. leather products,
transport equipment, electronics, ﬁnancial intermediation services). Finally, in Section 5,
we suggest some extensions of the basic model and directions for future work.
2 Economies of Agglomeration and Industrial Con-
centration: Theory vs. Empirical Evidence
In a nutshell, one might identify four main questions that scholars concerned about the
‘spatial dimension’ of economic interactions have been all trying to address, albeit from
diﬀerent perspectives, for more than a century, namely: (i) Could one neatly identify
agglomeration (centripetal) and dispersion (centrifugal) forces lying at the heart of the
processes generating sustained spatial concentration (and possibly its destabilization)? (ii)
Why and when could one observe persistent spatial patterns that cannot be explained
4by resorting to pre-existing heterogeneity in agents and locations (i.e. by some kind of
“comparative advantage theory” alone)? (iii) What is the role of mere “chance” in the
observed spatial concentration of economic activities? And: (iv) How and when emerging
spatial structures of production and innovation tend to become self-sustained over time?
(And, conversely, what make them wither away?)
As well known, Von Thünen (1826) and Marshall (1920) have been among the pioneers
in the investigation of economic forces driving geographical diﬀerentiation and agglomer-
ation. For instance, Von Thunen’s simple analysis of land use - by stressing the impor-
tance of space constraints in decentralized economies - began to uncover the relationships
between micro decisions and macro geographical outcomes. Even more importantly, Mar-
shall’s discussion of the ‘localization externalities triad’2 became a cornerstone in the theory
of economic agglomeration. From then on, however, diverse trajectories of theoretically-
grounded exploration emerged.
A ﬁrst family of models has been hinging upon the basic idea that many diﬀerent
spatial agglomeration patterns (from concentration of economic activities in few locations
to hierarchical structures) can be explained as the solution of a static, well-deﬁned, trade-
oﬀ between identiﬁable agglomeration and dispersion forces. This intuition, rooted once
again in Von Thunen’s work, has become the core of the analyses provided by ‘central-
place’ theory developed by Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1940), of ‘regional science’ models
building on Isard (1956) and of the treatment of urban systems by Henderson (1974).
More recently, it has inspired models with non-market externalities such as Papageorgiou
& Smith (1983), Fujita (1988) and Fujita (1989).
A second class of models that has become prominent in the last few years, known
under the heading of ‘New Economic Geography’ (NEG)3, acknowledges instead some form
of increasing returns (or indivisibilities) as both the incentive triggering agglomeration
2That is: (i) backward/forward linkages associated to the trade-oﬀ between market-size and market-
access; (ii) informational spillovers and (iii) advantages of thick markets for specialized local providers of
inputs.
3See Fujita, Krugman & Venables (1999) and references therein.
5and the force able to sustain concentration (once the latter has emerged). One of the
achievements of this stream of research has been to provide a treatment of some form of
increasing returns cum monopolistic competition in a static equilibrium framework with
fully rational agents. By bridging monopolistic competition models (cf. Dixit & Stiglitz
(1977)) and Samuelson “iceberg-like” trade costs (cf. Samuelson (1952)), such models
have been able to account for agglomeration patterns and inter-locational specialization by
positing a self-reinforcement process - stemming from some form of market externality -
which ﬁnds its counterpart in dispersion forces caused either by agglomeration itself or by
the immobility of some factors (e.g. labor)4.
Third,b u i l d i n go ni n s p i r i n gw o r k sb yB r i a nW .A r t h u ra n dP a u lD a v i d ,af e ws c h o l a r s
have been attempting to analyze the nature of economies/diseconomies of agglomeration
in explicitly dynamic frameworks where persistent spatio-temporal patterns emerge out of
the very sequence of interactions among heterogeneous economic agents. By acknowledging
the history- (or path-) dependent nature of the observed uneven spatial distribution of
economic activities, the basic argument stresses the importance of dynamic increasing
returns implied by some form of agglomeration economies/diseconomies (cf. Arthur (1994,
Chs. 4 and 6)) and/or local network externalities (cf. David, Foray & Dalle (1998) and
Cowan & Cowan (1998)). Notwithstanding their high level of abstraction, these models
are able to account for a rather wide array of spatial outcomes and to shed some light on
the ability of economies/diseconomies of agglomeration to shape long-run concentration
patterns. Together, they highlight how early, small, mainly non-predictable, events might
dynamically interact with more systematic forces in conveying persistent spatial structures.
Conversely, from a more inductive perspective, many scholars have been oﬀering a
wealth of qualitative analyses, building on several pieces of evidence on urban/regional
development and industrial agglomeration phenomena5. Furthermore, a long stream of
4Extensions of the baseline NEG model range from urban systems and city formation (Fujita, Krugman
& Mori (1999)), industrial specialization in an array of imperfectly competitive sectors (Venables (1998))
and growth (Fujita, Krugman & Venables (1999, Ch.4)).
5We refer here to the ‘economic geography’ literature (see Lee & Willis (1997) for a survey and the
references in Martin (1999)), which includes studies on industrial districts, cf. Antonelli (1990), Sforzi
6literature on multinational investment - from the pioneering works by Vernon (1966), all
the way to the recent contributions by Cantwell and colleagues (cf. e.g. Cantwell (1989) and
Cantwell & Iammarino (1998)) - are rich of insights on the interaction between technologies,
corporate strategies and locational features.
A survey of the evidence discussed in this enormous literature is well beyond the scope
of this paper (cf. Bottazzi, Dosi & Fagiolo (2002) for a more detailed discussion and some
taxonomic attempts). Here, let us just mention two sets of empirical regularities which are
of particular interest in what follows.
First, agglomeration phenomena typically yield quite diﬀerent ‘types’ of local structures.
Examples range from: (i) ‘horizontally diversiﬁed agglomerations’ (whereby activities pre-
viously vertically integrated within individual ﬁrms undergo a sort of ‘Smithian’ process of
division of labor cum branching out of diﬀerent ﬁrms); to: (ii) ‘hierarchical spatially local-
ized clusters’ (which generally involve an “oligopolistic core” together with subcontracting
networks); and: (iii) ‘Silicon Valley’ districts (where agglomeration phenomena are driven
by knowledge complementarities - at least partly fueled by ‘exogenous science’).
A high sectoral variability in agglomeration structures and in the nature of agglomer-
ation drivers clearly hints at the existence of large underlying sectoral and geographical
speciﬁcities permeating agglomeration processes. In this perspective, a second, related, set
of robust empirical evidence concerns the huge intersectoral diﬀerences in the revealed spa-
tial agglomeration outcomes. As a suggestive illustration, Fig. 1 plots the distributions of
some statistics computed on the frequency proﬁles of Italian ﬁrms belonging to diﬀerent
manufacturing sectors and located in each geographical location6.I t i s e a s y t o s e e t h e
(1989) and Beccattini (1990).
6Original data refers to geographical location (Year: 1996) of a sample of more than half a million
business units (BUs) disaggregated with respect to the ATECO 91 classiﬁcation (which coincides with
the 2-digit ISIC, Rev. 3, classiﬁcation). Each geographical location represents a ‘local system of labor
mobility’ (LSLM), that is a geographical area characterized by relatively high inward commuters’ ﬂows.
LSLMs are periodically updated by multivariate cluster analyses employing census data about social,
demographic and economic variables (see Sforzi (2000) for details). Frequency plots in Fig.1 are computed
as follows. Consider, for each LSLM, the frequency proﬁle of manufacturing BUs present in that location
and belonging to each 2-digit manufacturing sector (weighted by the relative size of each sector). For each
frequency proﬁle (location) we compute MIN, MAX, RANGE and Standard Deviation statistics and we
plot their frequency distribution. Among all LSLM in the dataset (784), we consider only those hosting at
7high variability in the distribution of manufacturing sectors across geographical sites. For
instance, there exists a high number of locations where ﬁrms belonging to almost all sectors
are equally represented. On the contrary, for a quite large frequency of sites, agglomeration
occurs only for ﬁrms belonging to a small number of sectors (in some cases 1 or 2). More
generally, in more than 50% of locations, a quite large fraction of sectors are not even
represented.
Taken together, these two pieces of evidence suggest a picture where diﬀerent drivers
of agglomeration, which might be economy-wide, location-speciﬁca n d / o rs e c t o r - s p e c i ﬁc,
interact over time (at possibly diﬀerent time- and space-scales) leading to patterns of
concentration exhibiting high variability both across locations and across industries. In
turn, diﬀerent types of drivers of agglomeration seem to be often nested in the nature of
sector-speciﬁc patterns of knowledge accumulation.
Indeed, the main conjecture that we want to explore in this paper is that cross-sectoral
diﬀerences in agglomeration forces ought to be - at least partly - explained on the grounds
of underlying diﬀerences in the processes of technological and organizational learning. The
latter are in fact likely to aﬀect the relative importance of phenomena such as localized
knowledge spillovers; inter- vs. intra-organizational learning; knowledge complementarities
fueled by localized labor-mobility; innovative explorations undertaken through spin-oﬀs
and, more generally, the birth of new ﬁrms.
With this task in mind, let us start by presenting a baseline, empirically testable, model
of ﬁrm locational choice.
3T h e M o d e l
Consider an economy with one industry and a potentially inﬁnite number of identical
ﬁrms. In the economy there are M ≥ 2 locations, labeled by j =1 ,...,M, which can be
thought as ‘production sites’ or ‘industrial districts’. Each location j is characterized by an
least 10 BUs (about 99% of the entire sample).
8intrinsic ‘geographical attractiveness’ aj > 0 and by an ‘agglomeration’ parameter bj > 0.
We suppose that both vectors a=( a1,...,aM) and b=( b1,...,bM) are common knowledge.
The coeﬃcients aj capture the gain from choosing to locate in j net of any agglomeration
eﬀects. On the contrary, bj measure the strength of agglomeration economies in location
j:al a r g e rbj implies a higher incentive to a ﬁrm from locating in j given the number of
ﬁrms that have already settled their activities in that location.
Time is discrete. Let nt
j be the number of ﬁrms present in location j at time t =
0,1,2,.... Suppose that at time t =0the size of the economy is N À M and assume an







The dynamics of the economy is governed by the following simple rules. At the begin-
ning of each time period t ≥ 1,aﬁrm is chosen at random among all incumbent ﬁrms to
‘die’ (i.e. disappear from the location where she operates). Next, a new ﬁrm enters and
chooses the site where to locate her production facilities. In line with Arthur (1994, Ch.4),
we model ﬁrms’ locational choices in a stochastic fashion. More precisely, we posit that a
ﬁrm entering the industry at time t chooses site j with a probability proportional to:
aj + bje n
t
j, (1)
where aj is the ‘intrinsic attractiveness’ of site j, bj is the ‘agglomeration’ parameter of site
j and e nt
j is the actual number of ﬁrms present at location j after exit has occurred (i.e.
e nt
j = nt
j − 1 if exit occurred in j and e nt
j = nt
j otherwise).
The state of the system is completely deﬁned, at each t ≥ 0, by the ‘occupation’
vector nt =( nt
1,...,nt
M). Since the state of the system at time t +1only depends on
nt, the dynamics of the economy is described by a ﬁnite Markov chain with state space
S = {(n1,...,nM):nj ≥ 0,
PM
j=1 nj = N}.
Results about the existence of a stationary (invariant) distribution for nt (and its char-
acterization) are provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Deﬁne p(nt;a,b) as the probability that the system is in the state nt at time







t = n; a,b}
as the generic element of the transition probability matrix of the associated Markov chain,
where n ∈ S, n
0
∈ S.T h e n :
1. Let ∆h =( 0 ,...,0,1,0,...0) the unitary M-vector with h-th component equal to 1. If
nt+1 6= nt +∆k −∆j for all k,j =1 ,...,M then P(n
0
|n;a,b)=0 .O t h e r w i s e ,i ft h e r e
exist k,j =1 ,...,M such that nt = n and nt+1 = n + ∆k − ∆j, then:
P(n + ∆k − ∆j|n;a,b)=

    








A+(1−N−1)b·n k = j
. (2)
where n =( n1,...,nM) ∈ S, A =
PM
m=1 am, b · n =
PM
m=1 bmnm.
2. The Markov chain governing the evolution of nt is irreducible and therefore admits a















h=1[aj + bj(h − 1)]
1











(1 − sb j)
−aj/bj|s=0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
An interesting case arises when agglomeration coeﬃcients are homogeneous across lo-
cations, i.e. bj = b>0, for all j. In such circumstances, one can assume w.l.o.g. that b =1
10so that any entrant ﬁrm will choose location j with probability proportional to:
aj + e n
t
j, (4)
where now the ‘intrinsic attractiveness’ aj might be interpreted as a relative measure of
agglomeration economies. In this simpliﬁed setting, a smaller aj implies stronger economies
of agglomeration. If (4) holds, the Markov chain governing the evolution of nt is still













j = aj(aj +1 )···(aj + nj − 1) is the Pochammer’s symbol (see Appendix B)7.
Coeﬃcients aj > 0 determine the nature of the distribution. As the values of a0’s get
bigger, the eﬀects of agglomeration economies wither away. In the limit, when aj → +∞
and aj/aj0 → 1 for any j and j0, agglomeration economies disappear and the expression in
(5) reduces to a multinomial distribution. On the contrary, when aj =1 ,∀j, (5) becomes
the Bose-Einstein distribution8.
Some remarks are in order. First, we assume that entry rates (i.e. birth rates) are pos-
itive, constant and equal to exit rates (i.e. death rates). The idea behind this assumption
comes from the observation that, at least in Italy9,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms belonging to a given
sector who enter and/or leave a given location in a relatively short period of time (e.g. a
year) is typically much larger than the net growth of industry size, so that the time-scale
at which spatial reallocations occur is generally very short. Therefore, the invariant (or
7The model with homogeneous b0s is a variation of the Ehrenfest-Brillouin urn-scheme. See Garibaldi
& Penco (2000) and Garibaldi, Penco & Viarengo (2002) for the case with 2 locations. A similar simpliﬁed
version is in Kirman (1993).
8Cf. e.g. Wio (1994) and Johnson, Kotz & Balakrishnan (1997). Notice also that values aj ≤ 0,
for some j, can be in principle considered in order to allow for negative ex-ante geographical beneﬁts.
However, since a negative aj would require the empirically questionable notion of upper bounds on the
number of ﬁrms that can be hosted in a location, we prefer to stick to the assumption of non-negative a’s.
9See e.g. quarterly reports by Unioncamere, “Movimprese: Dati Trimestrali sulla Nati-Mortalità delle
Imprese”, Uﬃci Studi e Statistica Camere di Commercio, Italy, various years, available on line at the url:
http://www.starnet.unioncamere.it.
11equilibrium) distributions in (3) and (5) does not necessarily depict a long-run state as-
sociated to some ‘old’ or ‘mature’ industry. Since each entry/exit decision made by any
one ﬁrm constitutes one time-step in the model, our invariant distributions describe the
state of the system after a suﬃcient large number of spatial reallocation events have taken
place (which may well imply a relatively short real-time horizon). Invariant distributions
c a nt h e nb ed i r e c t l yc o m p a r e dw i t hc r o s s - s e c t i o ne m p i r i c a ld a t ab e c a u s et h e yd e s c r i b ea
system which, for short real-time horizons, always appears in its equilibrium state10.
Second, and relatedly, we suppose that any ﬁrm remains in her location until she even-
tually exits from the industry. Individual locational choices might then be interpreted
as being irreversible. However, one-step transition probabilities computed in (2) are also
consistent with an alternative locational process involving reversible choices wherein: (i)
there is a constant population of N ﬁrms (no entry/exit); (ii) in each time period a ran-
domly drawn ﬁrm is allowed to switch location with probabilities proportional to (1), with
aj > 0 for all j. In both cases, the size of the industry is constant (equal to N) through-
out the whole process because the net growth rate is zero. Therefore, the impact of the
noise introduced in the system by any single additional decision (either due entry/exit or
between-location switches), albeit quite small, does not become negligible as t becomes
large. Thus, the equilibrium behavior of the system can be described, unlike models based
on Polya-urn schemes, by a non degenerate stationary distribution.
In the next Section, we will test the predictions of the model against data on geograph-
ical distribution of ﬁrms across Italian industrial districts. As a preliminary exercise, we
will focus on the case of homogeneous agglomeration coeﬃcients (bj = b>0), and em-
ploy (5) to test for the existence of persistence diﬀerences in the strength of agglomeration
economies among industrial sectors.
10Cf. also Appendix C for an interpretation of this property in terms of Polya-urn schemes. Long-term
modiﬁcations in the industrial structure might be instead captured by allowing a and b coeﬃcients to
change across subsequent phases of industry evolution, albeit in a time-scale much longer than the one
related to spatial reallocation decisions (i.e. indexed by t).
124 Agglomeration Economies and Industrial Sectors:
An Application to Italian Data
In this Section we shall attempt to address the following questions. First:D ot h e o r e t i c a l
distributions (derived from the model presented above) adequately replicate, for each given
sector, the observed frequency distributions of ﬁrms across locations? Second: What is the
statistical impact of intesectoral diﬀerences on the dynamics of spatial concentration?
Note that in order to start answering the latter question, one ought to disentangle
two basic factors jointly contributing to the observed sector-speciﬁcities in agglomera-
tion patterns, namely: (i) agglomeration drivers which, for any given sector, are location-
speciﬁc and generate agglomeration beneﬁts due to dynamic increasing returns to concen-
tration (e.g. ex-ante diﬀerences across geographical locations, economy-wide agglomeration
spillovers which cumulatively act upon the existing concentration patterns, etc.); (ii) ag-
glomeration drivers that are entirely sector-speciﬁc and promote concentration across all
geographical locations (e.g. thanks to economies of agglomeration forces that are intrinsi-
cally related to the way knowledge is accumulated, innovations are generated, etc.).
In this perspective, we present here a preliminary study focusing on four sectors: (a)
leather products; (b) transport equipment; (c) electronics; (d) ﬁnancial intermediation.
T h ec h o i c ei sm o t i v a t e db yt h eo b s e r v a t i o nt h a tt h e s ei n d u s t r i e sd i s p l a yal a r g ei n t e r -
sectoral variation as to their patterns of innovation and learning regimes, as well as the
average sizes of their BUs and their competition patterns. More precisely, according to
the descriptive taxonomy of industrial sectors ﬁrstly proposed by Pavitt (1984) and sub-
sequently developed in Malerba & Orsenigo (1996) and Marsili (2001), these industries
belong to four distinct groups (cf. also Table 1).
In Pavitt’s terminology, the leather industry - with the partial exception of ‘fashion
products’ - might be classiﬁed as a ‘supplier dominated’ (SD) sector, characterized by
relatively small ﬁrms whose innovative opportunities largely stem from external loci of
innovation (e.g. intermediate and capital inputs produced elsewhere). SD industries usu-
13ally involve high product diﬀerentiation and include most of the so-called “made-in-Italy”
activities (e.g. textiles, clothing, furniture, toys, etc.).
Transport equipment is a standard ‘scale-intensive’ (SI) sector, wherein large ﬁrms
generate (both internally and thanks to ‘specialized suppliers’) innovation in production
processes and, together, master the design and production of quite complex artifacts.
Electronics typically belongs to the class of ‘science-based’ (SB) sectors. Here inno-
vation in both products and processes is largely generated in R&D departments of ﬁrms
which often maintain strong links with universities and research centers.
Finally, ﬁnancial intermediation activities are ‘information intensive’ (II)s e c t o r s ,w h i c h
share with science-based industry the locus of innovation (R&D departments) and the
sources of innovative opportunities (universities and research centers). However, II sectors
typically diﬀer from SB ones as to the means of appropriating the economic rents from
their innovations. While science-based industries typically appropriate innovations through
patents and lead times of innovators vis-à-vis would-be imitators, information intensive
ones comparatively take more advantage of the tacitness of their knowledge bases (cf.
Malerba & Orsenigo (1996)).
The conjecture that we preliminary test in this work is that intersectoral diﬀerences
in the patterns of innovation creation, innovation ﬂows and learning regimes, as proxied
by Pavitt’s categorization, map into diﬀerent degrees of local agglomeration economies,
once diﬀerences due to location-speciﬁc agglomeration eﬀects have been factored out. It is
indeed likely that ﬁrms locational choices are aﬀected in quite diﬀerent ways by diﬀerent
appropriability means, distinct sources of innovation sources/types, as well as diﬀerent
channels through which technological information locally spills over. We suggest that such
spatially local, sector-speciﬁc, drivers might be able to account for the observed diﬀerences
of agglomeration patterns across industries.
Data and Methodology
The exercise employs a database provided by the Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT) from
14the Census of Manufacturers and Services. Data contain observations about more than half
a million business units (BUs), i.e. local plants. Each observation identiﬁes the location
of the BUs at a given point of time (end of 1996), as well as the industrial sector where it
operates. Observations refer to L =3 1industrial sectors11 while locations correspond to
M = 784 “local systems of labor mobility” (LSLM) (see footnote 6).
Let ni,l be the number of BUs in LSLM i operating in sector l. Denote with n.,l the
number of BUs operating in sector l and with ni,. the total number of BUs belonging to i-th
LSLM. Since a standard maximum likelihood procedure is not viable12, we shall estimate
coeﬃcients ail, for any given sector l, in two benchmark cases:
1. ail are homogeneous across locations, i.e. ail = αl,w h e r eαl > 0 is a sector-speciﬁc
parameter;
2. ail are heterogeneous across locations and ail = γl · θi|l,w h e r eγl is a sector-speciﬁc
parameter and θi|l, for any given sector, is a location-speciﬁc parameter.
Notice that in the case 1. one is assuming that location-speciﬁc agglomeration drivers
are homogeneous across LSLM. Under this hypothesis, BUs belonging to any given sector l
would choose any given geographical site with equal probability. On the other hand, in the
case 2. one assumes that the geographical attractiveness of any site i can be decomposed
into a factor that accounts for location- (and possibly sector-) speciﬁc (i.e. θi|l)l o c a l
attractiveness and a strictly sector-speciﬁc factor accounting for activity-speciﬁci n c r e a s i n g
returns to agglomeration (i.e. γl).
We estimate θi|l by using data about all sectors diﬀerent from l, which are assumed to be
exogenous with respect to the data generation process postulated in the single-sector model.
Hence, sector distributions, in both case 1. and 2., will depend on a single parameter (αl
or γl) that can be in turn estimated by a standard best-ﬁt procedure (e.g. minimization
of chi-square test between theoretical and empirical distributions).
11Data about industrial sectors are disaggregated according to the Italian ATECO 91 classiﬁcation
which corresponds to the 2-digit ISIC (Rev. 3) classiﬁcation.
12Unfortunately, data about suﬃciently long time series of homogeneous observations is still not available
at the appropriate disaggregated level.
15In order to compare theoretical predictions with empirical data, let us deﬁne the
marginal, site-occupancy, stationary probability distribution φ(h|ail,A,N) as the prob-
ability that a site with “intrinsic attractiveness” ail > 0 would host in the long-run exactly











For each sector under analysis, we may therefore compare the theoretical distribution
(6) with the corresponding observed frequency with which a LSLM hosting ni,l = h business







where δ(ni,l,h)=1if and only if ni,l = h.
Results
Let us begin by assuming that all locations are homogeneous as to their intrinsic geograph-
ical attractiveness. In this case, the process is driven only by economies of agglomeration
which are themselves homogeneous across locations. More formally, for any single sector l,











Notice that φ will now depend, for any l,o nas i n g l ep a r a m e t e rαl measuring the strength
of the agglomeration eﬀect (recall that a low αl means strong agglomeration economies).
For each sector under study, the agglomeration parameter will then be estimated as:
α
∗




where χ2 is the standard goodness-of-ﬁt test between two binned (theoretical and empirical)
16frequency distributions and Λ i sa ne v e n l y - s p a c e dg r i do fv a l u e sf o ral > 0.
Interestingly, tests of this model yield very bad agreement with data, with ‘predicted’
theoretical distributions ϕl(h;α∗
l) always underestimating observed distribution tails. In
particular, χ2 tests reject the hypothesis that data come from the distribution in (8) for
any value of αl > 0, in all four sectors under analysis.
The reason why this is the case becomes evident if one plots, for any given sector l,t h e
number of BUs located in the LSLM i (ni,l) against the total number of BUs belonging to all
sectors but l (i.e. ni,. −ni,l). Under the assumption of homogeneous intrinsic geographical
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s ,a n yt w oB U sb e l o n g i n gt od i ﬀerent sectors should choose the same location
with equal probability. Therefore, no statistically signiﬁcant correlation should appear
between ni,l and ni,.−ni,l for any l. Conversely, as Fig. 2 shows, for any of the four chosen
sectors a statistically signiﬁcant positive correlation between the two variables appears,
contradicting the conjecture that all LSLM have the same ex-ante attractiveness.
Suppose instead that the degrees of intrinsic geographical attractiveness are heteroge-
nous across locations and let ail = γl·θi|l. Here θi|l represents the strength of agglomeration
economies of location i in sector l. Given the high correlation between ni,l and ni,. − ni,l










where γl > 0 measures industry-speciﬁce ﬀects due to economies of agglomeration. Co-
eﬃcients θi|l capture here the eﬀect of local agglomeration drivers which, for each given
sector, are location-speciﬁc (as compared to agglomeration forces which on the contrary
act at an economy-wide level). The latter include all factors which make a location intrinsi-
cally preferable compared to others, in terms of e.g. better industrial infrastructures, sheer
overall size, etc., all the way to local spillovers that generate dynamic increasing returns
to agglomeration for all sectors.
Since our data-generation process refers to a single sector, we can proxy θi|l by using
17exogenous information about the behavior of all ﬁrms belonging to all sectors diﬀerent
from the one under consideration. If (10) holds, the theoretical frequency of ﬁnding a
LSLM hosting exactly h BUs in sector l can be easily computed by averaging marginal
probabilities in (6) over all LSLM, after having controlled for the size of each sector. The






φ(h|ai,l,A l,n .,l), (11)
where φ is the probability distribution in (6), ai,l are deﬁn e da si n( 1 0 ) ,A l =
PM
i=1 ai,l
and n.,l is the number of BUs in sector l.S i n c eψl depends, for any sector l, only on γl,
we can use the same ﬁtting procedure we employed in the homogenous coeﬃcients case.
‘Predicted’ values for γl are therefore computed as:
γ
∗




where χ2 is deﬁned as above and G is an evenly-spaced grid of values for γl > 0.
Table 2 reports ‘predicted’ values for sectoral agglomeration parameters, their 5% con-




l) and fl. In all four sectors, ‘predicted’ theoretical distributions ψ
∗
l
ﬁt very well empirical frequencies. Indeed, one cannot reject the hypothesis that ψ
∗
l are
diﬀerent from empirical distributions fl(h). As to the magnitudes of the predicted param-
eters, notice that ‘leather’, ‘transport equipment’ and ‘electronics’ sectors seem to display
higher agglomeration economies (i.e. comparably small γ’s) as compared to ‘ﬁnancial in-
termediation’. This conjecture seems conﬁrmed by Figs. 3 through 6, where predicted (ψ
∗
l)
and empirical (fl) frequencies are plotted. While the ﬁrst three sectors studied exhibit the
standard skewed shape associated to high agglomeration forces, ﬁnancial intermediation is
characterized by a more dispersed distribution of BUs across locations.
13Conﬁdence intervals contain all values of γl such that Prob{χ2
D >χ 2(fl,ψ l)} < 0.05,w h e r eχ2
D is a
r.v. distributed as a χ2(D) and D are the degrees of freedom of the test.
18In order to test whether estimated coeﬃcients statistically diﬀer across sectors, we
performed χ2 tests for the diﬀerence between any two distributions. We ﬁr s tt e s tw h e t h e r
any two ‘predicted’ distributions are diﬀerent. Results reported in Table 3 show that
theoretical distributions ψ
∗
l are all statistically diﬀerent from each other. Notice, however,
that conﬁdence intervals for γ∗
l partly overlap (see Table 2), especially as far as ‘leather’
and ‘transport equipment’ sectors are concerned. Therefore, to further explore if estimated




the distribution of sector l2 6= l1 computed employing the ‘predicted’ parameter value for
sector l1. If they statistically diﬀer, then one might reasonably conclude that γ∗
l1 6= γ∗
l2.
Results reported in Table 4 conﬁrm that ‘ﬁnancial intermediation’ exhibits agglomera-
tion economies statistically lower than the other three sectors. Furthermore, ‘electronics’
appears to display intermediate values of γ’s, while ‘leather’ and ‘transport equipment’ are
characterized by high (but not statistically diﬀerent) agglomeration strength.
These results are in line with qualitative analyses on the relationships between the
intersectoral patterns of innovation/learning regimes and geographical concentration of
economic activities (cf. inter alia Antonelli (1994)). Agglomeration economies may be
expected to be relevant in SI and SD sectors (represented here indeed by ‘leather’ and
‘transport equipment’), albeit for diﬀerent reasons. ‘Scale intensive’ sectors are likely to
involve hierarchical relations among ﬁrms, leading to geographical clustering characterized
by an “oligopolistic core” together with subcontracting networks. Conversely, diﬀerent
drivers might lead to observationally similar statistical eﬀects in those sectors which Pavitt
(1984) calls ‘supplier dominated’. The forces fueling many Italian industrial districts,
mostly featuring in this category, point at processes of inter-ﬁrm division of labor, at
knowledge complementarities, and at various district-speciﬁc institutional arrangements as
factors underlying agglomeration (cf. for instance Brusco (1982) and Piore & Sabel (1984)).
Agglomeration economies should also appear signiﬁcant in SB sectors, due to ‘Silicon Val-
ley’ eﬀects based on knowledge complementarities and on particular institutions fueling
“exogenous science”. However, as already noted in Bottazzi et al. (2002), science-based
19sectors do not display in Italy striking agglomeration eﬀects, probably due to the under-
lying weakness of ‘fueling’ research institutions, with nothing even vaguely comparable to
Stanford, UC Berkeley or MIT. Finally, ﬁrms belonging to II industries (e.g. banks and in-
surance companies) do not appear to enjoy important agglomeration economies. Therefore,
at least in our benchmark II sector, agglomeration economies implied by the existence of
large ﬁxed costs associated to local provision of specialized intermediate goods (e.g. related
to extensive adoption of information and communication technology goods and services)
seem to be overcome by ‘monopolistically competitive’ strategies of branch location near
the customers (see Fujita & Hamaguchi (2001)).
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Economies of agglomeration have been shown to play a key role in the emergence of rel-
atively stable patterns of industrial clustering. However, existing theoretical endeavours
attempting to explain industrial concentration on the basis of some form of dynamic in-
creasing returns to agglomeration have been largely neglecting the vast amount of empirical
evidence about inter-sectoral diﬀerences in the patterns of spatial activity.
In this paper, we argued that cross-sectional diﬀerences in agglomeration forces might
be (at least partly) explained by underlying diﬀerences in the processes of ﬁrms’ technolog-
ical and organizational learning. We presented a very simple model of industrial clustering
in which adaptive ﬁrms make locational choices in presence of agglomeration economies.
The latter stem from both standard comparative advantage arguments (making some lo-
cations inherently more attractive than others) and dynamic increasing returns to scale in
agglomeration which can be both sector- and industry-speciﬁc. We tested the predictions
of the model about the long-run distribution of the size of spatial clusters against data on
Italian ‘local system of labor mobility’ (i.e. a proxy for industrial districts).
In each sector under analysis, the accordance of theoretical predictions with data is quite
high, with statistically signiﬁcant, sector- and location-speciﬁc, economies of agglomera-
20tion. In turn, underlying diﬀerences in the modes of innovative exploration and knowledge
accumulation, we suggest, are likely to map into sectoral speciﬁcities in the strength of
geographical clustering.
Of course one may think of several ways forward with respect to the foregoing analysis.
First, our basic conjecture on the role of technological speciﬁcities as determinants of the
intensity of agglomeration, if any, is going to be fully corroborated only by studying many
more sectors, possibly in diﬀerent countries. Second, one may incorporate explicit local
interactions among ﬁrms and non-linear formulations of the location probabilities. Third,
it would be interesting to consider inter-sectoral interactions in location patterns.
Existing evidence does suggest widespread phenomena of clustering of innovation activ-
ities (cf. Cowan & Cowan (1998) and Brusco (1982), among others). Moreover, technology-
speciﬁc interactions between location of innovative activities and location of production in
the case of multinational corporations has been identiﬁed by Cantwell and collaborators (see
e.g. Cantwell (1989) and Feldman (1994)). The foregoing study is, in many respects, com-
plementary to such investigations and, hopefully, moves some steps ahead toward bridging
the geography of location with the economics and geography of innovation.
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Figure 1: Frequency distributions of MAX (Top-Left), MIN (Top-Right), RANGE
(Bottom-Left) and STANDARD DEVIATION (Bottom-Right) statistics computed on
the weighted frequency proﬁle of Italian manufacturing business units (BUs) belonging to
diﬀerent industrial sectors (2-digit disaggregation) present in each geographical location
in 1996. For each statistics S, a circle corresponding to a value s on the x-axis represents
the % of all locations for which the statistics S (computed on the weighted frequency
proﬁle of ﬁrms belonging to each industrial sector present in that location) is equal to s.
Locations are deﬁned in terms of Local Systems of Labor Mobility (cf. footnote 6).






















































































Figure 2: Number of business units belonging to sector l l o c a t e di nag i v e nL o c a lS y s t e m
of Labor Mobility (ni,l) vs. the total number of BUs belonging to all sectors but l
(ni,· − ni,l). Panels: a) Leather products; b) Transport equipment; c) Electronics; d)
Financial Intermediation. All variables are in log scale. Estimated Slopes of Linear
Regressions (signiﬁcance of t-test b β =0in brackets): (a) b β =0.443 (0.0001); (b) b β =0.798
(0.0002); (c) b β =0.727 (0.0001); b β =0.746 (0.0000). Source: Our elaborations on ISTAT,
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Figure 3: Leather Products. Observed vs. Theoretical Frequencies of BUs (business
units) in LSLM (Local System of Labor Mobility). Y-axis: Frequency of LSLM hosting h
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Figure 4: Transport Equipment. Observed vs. Theoretical Frequencies of BUs
(business units) in LSLM (Local System of Labor Mobility). Y-axis: Frequency of LSLM
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Figure 5: Electronics. Observed vs. Theoretical Frequencies of BUs (business units) in
LSLM (Local System of Labor Mobility). Y-axis: Frequency of LSLM hosting h BUs.
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Figure 6: Financial Intermediation. Observed vs. Theoretical Frequencies of BUs
(business units) in LSLM (Local System of Labor Mobility). Y-axis: Frequency of LSLM
hosting h BUs. Source: Our elaborations on ISTAT, 1996 data.
28Sector ISIC Class Pavitt’s Group
Leather D.19 Supplier Dominated (SD)
Transport Equipment D.34, D.35 Scale Intensive (SI)
Electronics D.30, D.31, D.32, D.33 Science Based (SB)
Financial Intermediation J.65, J.66, J.67 Information Intensive (II)
Table 1
The Statistical Classiﬁcation of the considered Sectors.
Sector (l) γ∗
l Conﬁdence Intervals χ2(fl,ψl(γ∗
l)) Prob{χ2
D >χ 2(fl,ψ l(γ∗
l))}
Leather 0.0032 (0.0026, 0.0098) 52.6760 0.3709
Transport
Equipment
0.0128 (0.0087, 0.0169) 58.7517 0.1855
Electronics 0.0376 (0.0301, 0.0462) 54.2862 0.3147
Financial In-
termediation
0.7871 (0.7101, 0.8005) 44.1767 0.7051
Table 2
‘Predicted’ Agglomeration Parameters γ∗
l =a r gm i n γl∈G χ2(fl,ψ l).C o n ﬁdence Intervals
for γ∗
l contain all γl s.t. the 5% Chi-Square test between ψl(h;γl) and fl is not rejected.




m)) Leather Transport Electronics Financial
Leather ¤ 0.0523 0.0002 0.0001
l Transport 0.0523 ¤ 0.0000 0.0000
Electronics 0.0002 0.0000 ¤ 0.0000
Financial 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 ¤
Table 3
Tail probabilities for the Chi-Square test between ψl(γ∗
l) (‘predicted’ distribution for
sector l) and ψm(γ∗




l)) Leather Transport Electronics Financial
Leather ¤ 0.9942 0.0621 0.0000
l Transport 0.9598 ¤ 0.0000 0.0000
Electronics 0.0771 0.0000 ¤ 0.0000
Financial 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 ¤
Table 4
Tail probabilities for the Chi-Square test between ψl(γ∗
l) (distribution for sector l
computed at the ‘predicted’ value for sector l)a n dψm(γ∗
l) (distribution for sector m
computed at the ‘predicted’ value for sector l). Degrees of freedom: D =5 0 .
30Appendices
AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
Point 1. Let P(n
0
|n;a,b) be the generic element of the transition matrix of the Markov
chain that describes the dynamics of the system. Moreover, let p(nt = n;a,b) the proba-
bility that the chain is in the state n at time t (in the following we will omit, for the sake
of simplicity, parameters a,b).
We have assumed that in any time period only one ﬁrm will exit her current location
and only one ﬁrm will enter one of the M locations (possibly including the one in which
exit has occurred). Therefore, given nt = n,t h es t a t ea tt i m et+1must necessarily be such
that either (i) there exist two locations, say k0 and k00, k0 6= k00such that nk0t+1 = nk0t − 1
and nk00t+1 = nk00t +1 ;or (ii) nt+1 = nt, if the entrant has chosen the same location of
the exiting ﬁrm. Hence if nt+1 6= nt + ∆k − ∆j for all k,j =1 ,...,M then P(n0|n)=0 .
Otherwise, if there exist k,j =1 ,...,M such that nt = n and nt+1 = n+∆k −∆j, then for
any j,k =1 ,...,M:
Pr{n + ∆k − ∆j|n} =P r {A Firm Exits from location j}·
·Pr{Entrant Chooses location k|A Firm Exits from location j}.
As the exiting ﬁrm is chosen at random from all incumbent ﬁrms then:





From (1), we also have that the entrant ﬁrm will ﬁnd nt
k ﬁrms in any location k 6= j, while
31(if a ﬁrm has left location j) she will ﬁnd nt
j − 1 ﬁrms in location j.T h u s :
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This proves Point 1.
Point 2. For strictly positive aj,j=1 ,...,M, each location has a strictly pos-
itive probability of receiving the entering ﬁrm, see (2). Therefore any state n ∈ S =
{(n1,...,nM):nj ≥ 0,
PM
j=1 nj = N} is reachable with a positive probability in a suitable















where n,n0 ∈ S and P is the transition matrix. By using eq. (14) and transition probabil-
32ities given in (2), one gets:




aj + bj(nj − 1)
. (15)
The invariant distribution can thus be obtained by recursively applying (15) for a given
initial occupancy vector in S. Let n∗1 =( N,0,...,0) be the state of the system with all
ﬁrms in the ﬁrst location and let π∗1 = π(n∗1;a,b). Now suppose to move n2 ≥ 1 ﬁrms
from the ﬁrst to the second location. By applying recursively (15) one obtains:





j1=1 [a1 + b1(j1 − 1)] ·
Qn2
j2=1[a2 + b2(j2 − 1)]
QN
j1=1[a1 + b1(j1 − 1)]
.
Suppose now to further move n3 ≥ 1 ﬁrms from the ﬁrst to the third location, while
keeping n2 ﬁrms in location 2. Using again eqs. (15) and (16), one gets:
π((N − n2 − n3,n 2,n 3,...,0);a,b)=π
∗1 N!
(N − n2 − n3)!n2!n3!
· (17)
QN−n2−n3
j1=1 [a1 + b1(j1 − 1)] ·
Qn2
j2=1[a2 + b2(j2 − 1)] ·
Qn3
j3=1[a3 + b3(j3 − 1)]
QN
j1=1[a1 + b1(j1 − 1)]
Notice that the result in (17) does not depend on the order in which ﬁrms have been moved
from location 1 to locations 2 and 3. Therefore, a clear pattern emerges. Consider a generic
occupancy vector n=(n1,n 2,...,n M) ∈ S obtained by moving exactly nk ≥ 1 ﬁrms from
the ﬁrst to the k- t hl o c a t i o na n dd e ﬁning n1 = N −
PM

















h=1[aj + bj(h − 1)]
1
1 ≤ nj ≤ N
nj =0
.
Notice that, if nj =0for some j,t h e nϑ(nj;aj,b j)=1because no factors are generated.
Finally, by imposing the obvious condition that probabilities must sum up to one and from













h=0 (x + hy) k>1
1 k =1
. (19)


























for a generic (positive) w. Following Gradshteyn & Ryzhik (2000, p.966), one obtains:
˜ θ(s;x,y)=( 1− sy)
−x/y (23)
and eq. (20) immediately follows.














(1 − sj bj)
−aj/bj |s=0 (24)















(1 − sj bj)
−aj/bj. (25)
























(1 − sb j)
−aj/bj|s=0. (27)
B The Invariant Distribution when b0s are Homoge-
neous across Locations
Suppose that bj = b all j. As the probability that an entrant chooses location k given that
a ﬁrm exits from location j is deﬁned up to a proportionality constant - cf. eq. (1) - one can
assume b =1 . Therefore, the proportionality constant in (13) boils down to H = A+N −1
and transition probabilities in (2) read:




















aj(aj +1 )···(aj + nj − 1)
1





j is the Pochammer’s symbol. From eq. (27), we observe that in this case the










which can be easily computed and reads Z(a)=A[N]. Thus the exact formulation for the











C Recovering the Polya Approach
Consider the stationary distribution given in (5). Following Johnson et al. (1997, Chs. 40),
it is easy to show that (5) can be also interpreted as the time-t probability distribution of
a Polya entry process in which ﬁrms make irreversible locational choices.
More precisely, suppose an industry (i.e. a urn) with a potentially inﬁnite number of
ﬁrms (i.e. balls) and M locations (i.e. balls’ colors or types). At time t =0the state of





i = N0,w h e r en0
i is
the number of balls of color i in the urn. At any time period, a ball at random is extracted
from the urn and put once again in the urn together with c ≥ 1 other balls of the same
color. A standard result is that the probability that at time τ>1 the occupancy vector is
nτ =( nτ
1,...,nτ
M) À 0, with
PM
i=1 nτ




Γ(N +1 ) Γ(N0)


























where a[x] = a(a+1)···(a+x−1) is the Pochammer’s symbol. Therefore, if aj = n0
j, the
probability distribution (33) becomes the invariant distribution for the Ehrenfest-Brillouin
model (5). This results allows us to directly compute (using standard results for the Polya
process theory, cf. Johnson et al. (1997, Chs. 40)), the marginal probability that a site with
intrinsic beneﬁt a w i l lc o n t a i ni nt h el o n g - r u ne x a c t l yk ﬁrms. Indeed, the latter marginal
distribution is equal to the marginal probability that in an urn with 2 colors there will be
k balls with the ﬁrst color, when in the urn there are N balls and the initial number of
balls of the ﬁrst color were a,c f .e q .( 6 ) .
Notice ﬁnally that, in contrast with the process of ﬁrms locational choice presented in
Section 3, initial conditions (i.e. the number of ﬁrms initially present in each locations)
matter in the ﬁnite-time probability distribution of the Polya process. As net industry
growth rate is positive (entry rate is equal to c while exit rate is zero) locational decisions are
irreversible. Therefore, dynamic increasing returns strongly aﬀect long-run agglomeration
patterns as early micro events may cumulatively reinforce the agglomeration beneﬁto f
any given location, possibly overcoming ex-ante intrinsic comparative advantages. The
impact of additional perturbations caused by entry becomes progressively negligible in the
long-run, thus leading to lock-in of the system. On the other hand, the Ehrenfest-Brillouin
interpretation is consistent with always-reversible decisions: initial conditions never matter
for the invariant distribution. As the size of any individual perturbation does not die out
with time, the strength of dynamic increasing returns is much weaker than in the Polya
interpretation.
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